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Abstract
I am doing three things in my mission as Ambassador to the United Nations. First, and here
is where I need your help, the United States needs to pay its bills to the United Nations. We owe
US$ 1 billion, give a few or so million. Second, together we have to do something positive in the
area of U.N. reform - and that is happening. There is no reason why the United Nations cannot run
more efficiently with fewer people - more consolidated with respect to general functions. There is
no reason why we cannot say that we should ask those tough questions on peacekeeping missions,
like: “How much is it going to cost? What is the mandate? What is the agenda? When are we
going to get out?”
ADDRESS
THE UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED
STATES, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*
Ambassador William B. Richardson**
I am doing three things in my mission as Ambassador to the
United Nations. First, and here is where I need your help, the
United States needs to pay its bills to the United Nations. We
owe US$1 billion, give a few or so million. Second, together we
have to do something positive in the area of U.N. reform-and
that is happening. There is no reason why the United Nations
cannot run more efficiently with fewer people-more consoli-
dated with respect to general functions. There is no reason why
we cannot say that we should ask those tough questions on
peacekeeping missions, like: "How much is it going to cost?
What is the mandate? What is the agenda? When are we going
to get out?"
There is no reason why the United States should continue
to be assessed at thirty-one percent for peacekeeping and twenty-
five percent for the U.N. regular budget. The world has
changed. There is a different economy. We need a more equita-
bly distributed assessment rate. That does not mean the United
States should shirk its responsibility. Our proposal would reduce
our peacekeeping assessment to twenty-five percent and our
U.N. regular budget assessment to twenty percent. So the sec-
ond big agenda item is reform.
We have a Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who is a re-
former, who is moving in the right direction. One of the big
jobs that I have is to negotiate a package with the Congress that
deals with the arrears issue-a package that perhaps over three
years pays them off; continues our contributions to the United
Nations at a reduced assessment rate; and introduces strong
management reform. A more efficient United Nations can de-
liver better services for those continents, like Africa, that are,
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right now, under strife, and other refugee, human rights, de-
mocratization, and peacekeeping functions that the United Na-
tions does so well. And reform is not just a U.S. issue. The
Europeans are for it. The Argentines are for it. The Latin
Americans are for it. It is something that we need to approach
as a U.N. problem, not just a U.S. issue.
The third agenda item that I have since coming into the job
is to convince the American people that the United Nations is
important to U.S. interests. The U.N. has a public image prob-
lem in the United States. When I was a New Mexico Congress-
man, being an internationalist and voting as an internationalist,
I used to get questions: "Isn't the United Nations an entity of
world government? What about those black helicopters that
come in? What about that the United Nations that always votes
against us? Why is it that Africa and Asia and many other nations
have very bad voting records with U.S. interests at the United
Nations?"
That is a fallacious argument. The Ambassador from Argen-
tina sent me a note that showed how Argentina is in the 1990s
supporting U.S. issues at the United Nations, which is the case
with many other countries in the Third World that basically on a
composite scale support our basic interests.
The agenda that I am trying to pursue is that the United
Nations is important to U.S. interests; we should pay our bills
and get on with it. The United Nations is important because,
simply, it is an institution whereby we can build coalitions and
foreign policy support among many nations for our goals.
Therefore, we can protect our interests, costing less for U.S. tax-
payers, and advance our foreign policy agenda in support of de-
mocratization, human rights, peacekeeping, sustainable develop-
ment, and the rights of women around the world, and ensure
that we have an arena where we can deal with the big problems
affecting the world.
What are the big problems in the next ten years for the
United States and challenges for the rest of the world? Nuclear
proliferation; international terrorism; the spread of narcotics;
environmental degradation; problems and tensions relating
from economic competition; the rise of Islamic fundamentalism;
and regional conflicts from tribal ethnic hatred. The answer is
that the United Nations dealing with these issues multilaterally,
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and in a multinational, concerted fashion serves our interests,
and we can deal with those problems better. That is the message
that I am spreading across our country.
It was through the United Nations that the United States
was able to achieve collective action against Iraq when it was in-
vading Kuwait, and broad international support was initiated for
some U.S. broad foreign policy goals in that region, along with
North Korea, particularly the freezing of North Korea's nuclear
development. Because of the threat of U.N. sanction, North Ko-
rea reached an agreement with the United States to freeze its
nuclear development.
If you look at the major peacekeeping initiatives and
problems around the world, it is the United Nations that has
either peacekeepers or has a broad array of peacemaking func-
tions with special envoys. It is the United Nations that is active
today giving a blessing to a series of countries dealing with a cri-
sis in Albania, in Macedonia, in Bosnia, in Haiti, in Guatemala-
having resolved that problem basically with a historic peace
agreement between the rebels and the Government that would
bring stability to that region-going as far as Burundi and
Rwanda, where we are trying to do the right thing to alleviate the
human suffering there.
If you come to New York and go to the United Nations, you
will see men and women fighting for rights of women, fifty per-
cent of the population, including a number of issues affecting
abuse (both child abuse and sexual abuse), worker rights among
women, genital mutilation, and child prostitution. Here is an
entity, the United Nations, that is trying to deal with problems,
and it is in our interest to be part of it and to back it and to be
supportive.
QUESTION: What is the future of the relations between
Turkey and Greece?
AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON: Right now, through the
United Nations, which has a special envoy, and through an initi-
ative that we hope to undertake in the United States-perhaps a
special envoy there-it is our view that we need to address the
tensions arising from the Aegean dispute, which is basically a ter-
ritorial dispute between Greece and Turkey; the Cyprus ques-
tion, which has bedeviled many administrations and that we have
not resolved; the issues relating to the importance of the military
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relationship that the United States has with both Greece and
Turkey and how we deal with the competing interests between
the two; and lastly, ways in which the United States deals with
one of its long-time allies, Turkey, that has basically right now a
fundamentalist administration.
This is a very sensitive strategic area. But the cornerstone of
the policy in Turkey is support for a U.N. operation that we have
in Cyprus that has kept things relatively cool in terms of the bor-
der. It is also launching a peace initiative this year, either
through continued support for U.N. mediation or a U.S. special
envoy, to try to deal with some of the issues there.
QUESTION: What specific reforms does the Ambassador
have in mind for the United Nations and how can they be imple-
mented by the Secretary General?
AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON: The first reform is that the
United Nations live under a budget cap, which it normally has
not, and which for the last biennium it has-US$2.6 billion.
That budget cap should gradually decrease over the years. That
is happening and is projected for the next biennium. That is
number one.
Number two is staff cuts. There are too many people at the
United Nations; there are 10,000 in the Secretariat. The Secre-
tary General has pressed for 1000 staff cuts in the offices around
the Secretariat. We think that is good. We want to make them
permanent staff cuts. The Secretary General is doing that. We
have pushed for that in the last couple of years. That is an im-
portant initiative. Do we need that many people?
Number three is to cut Inspector General functions within
the United Nations. If there is waste, fraud, and abuse, we need
to protect whistle blowers. We should find ways to make func-
tions within the U.N. bureaucracy more effective. Recently, the
Inspector General's Office ("OIOS") found some real problems
in the Rwanda Tribunal which dealt with justice-or lack ofjus-
tice-in war crimes there. Officials were dismissed. That is the
work that we want it to do.
Number four is assessments. This is a big one for us. Pay
less, in terms of what we believe the United Nations does in
terms of its functions and big power relationships. We are pro-
posing a reduction from thirty-one percent to twenty-five per-
cent in peacekeeping for the United States and twenty-five per-
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cent to twenty percent in U.N. dues. We are also saying that
other countries, the "tigers"-Singapore, South Korea, and
China (China pays 0.7 percent)-should pay three percent.
They do not agree. But that is an issue that involves significant
reform with nations paying, in our judgment, a more equitable
rate.
Number five is consolidation. Kofi Annan should be com-
mended for consolidating three different development agencies
into one. There is no reason why that cannot happen more.
Number six, a significant one for us and some of the West-
ern nations, is peacekeeping. We made some mistakes in the
past, such as Somalia. We learned from those mistakes, that
when you go into a peacekeeping mission you need to ask the
tough questions, like: "When are we going to get out? What is
the purpose? How much is it going to cost? What is command
and control?" A lot of Americans do not like the idea of U.S.
troops being under foreign control. Be specific about how we
resolve that. "What is the mandate of the peacekeeping mission?
The rules of engagement?"
Every time there is a peacekeeping mission-and we deal
with those on a daily basis at the Security Council-those tough
questions are asked. A more modernized, efficient peacekeep-
ing function involving several countries is needed with com-
mand and control structures within the United Nations.
That is the kind of specific reforms we are looking for, and
those reforms are happening.
QUESTION: What can -the United States do to the United
Nations to promote human rights in China, and, in the case of
Bosnia, to bring those who are guilty to justice?
AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON: Number one, we can
strengthen the United Nations as an entity of human rights. A
new position has opened up, the head of the Human Rights
Commission, based in Geneva. It is a high level position. The
director who formerly was there from Ecuador left. We need a
strong replacement.
Number two, we cannot influence the votes of many coun-
tries at the United Nations on human rights issues, but we can
work it hard. Now, I was personally in Geneva last week pushing
for a strong human rights resolution on China. Yes, China is
important to us strategically and commercially, but we had set
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up some benchmarks that said there is going to have to be some
significant improvements in human rights if we, the United
Sates, are not going to raise that as the most important agenda
item at this U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva.
We have done that. We are supporting a strong resolution
sponsored by Denmark. But our first task is to make sure that a
Chinese effort for what is called the "no action" motion-so that
a vote does not take place-is defeated. That is going to be a
very, very narrow vote, and we are working very hard on that.
We are also pushing for some new initiatives on Burma. If
you want to get educated about a human rights violator, learn
about Burma. There is a very courageous woman by the name of
Aung San Suu Kyi. I hope you learn about her. Nelson
Mandela, a heroic figure, got all the attention, but this woman is
equally as strong and determined and deserving of support from
the international community.
You are right on the issue of Bosnia. We need to find ways
to implement and make that War Tribunals work. We are not
just talking about what you mentioned, but also making sure that
after you convict somebody that justice is taken care of, that the
people who run this institution are properly trained. We are
working on that. Do not lose hope on that. Be patient.
QUESTION: Should the United States pay its dues before
U.N. reform?
AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON: We should pay our bills,
there is no question about it, but it should not be that we pay
our bills and then reform. I think we have to do both together
because I think the institution is served well.
For those who do not think there is reform at the United
Nations, that is not the case. It is a good institution. It can con-
tribute to world peace. But if it ran better we could have re-
sponded more efficiently and effectively to the Great Lakes crisis
in Africa and many other problems that have existed. The ques-
tion is going to be: Can the U.S. Congress agree to such a pack-
age? I am hopeful they can.
QUESTION: There has been a lot talk about what the Sec-
retary General can do to reform the United Nations. The Secre-
tary General, however, only controls fifty percent of the budget.
What can be done to reform the other fifty percent?
AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON: Well, first of all, the
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United Nations is controlled by the 185 member states. We are
talking about a lot of unaffiliated agencies within the United Na-
tions and international organizations that have to be part of this
effort. The question is how do you deal with them too?
The Secretary General is a big player. Maybe he only con-
trols the Secretariat, but there is the power of the pulpit. And
then, the United States is a big player, as are many nations that
are contributors on a voluntary basis-in some branches of the
United Nations you contribute on a voluntary basis to these insti-
tutions.
We think that the outlook is not as glum as you may have
painted. I think there is a European Union initiative on reform
that differs a little bit from ours. Quite frankly, some of the
problems in some of the extensive reforms that we wanted have
come from the G-77, many Third World countries that see the
United Nations as their voice. They do not want it to change. It
has been difficult getting their total support. Because you are
being frank, I am being frank.
But we think if we can show that the funds from these re-
forms-and this is something that the United States is pushing
and that the Secretary General is pushing-were to shift to de-
velopment, to people programs, and were to work efficiently
through a good consolidated system, they would approve these
reforms. We are trying to ensure that the main U.N. purpose in
the areas of, not just peace and security, but human rights and
development are achieved.
Yes. There have been problems. Yes. We share in those
problems. But, I believe right now all of us, as Americans, must
view the United Nations as a good tool in our foreign policy, and
dumping on it, being negative, and not paying our arrears cost
us. U.S. influence is lessened there. So, there is a direct loss of
benefits for our country.
The head of UNDP, the development program, is an Ameri-
can; the world food program, an American; the Under Secretary
of Management, an American; and many other agencies are
headed by Americans. Do not think that there have not been
threats that these positions in the future, because we do not pay
our dues, will not go to Americans.
QUESTION: Why did the United States, the remaining su-
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perpower, vote alone in not condemning Israel in the recent Is-
raeli housing issue?
AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON: First of all, we were not
alone. It was the United States and Israel. The Marshall Islands
abstained also. But we took a whipping, 138-2. I am not mini-
mizing what you said.
Here is our position: we believe that issues related to the
Middle East peace process should not be handled at the United
Nations, where Israel is grossly out-numbered, and the issues
that deal with Har Homa, final status issues, and Jerusalem,
should be dealt with by the parties themselves. We, the United
States, are the honest broker. As you said we are the super-
power. We are trying to bring both sides together. There are
problems out there. There is loss of trust. We think the Har
Homa decision was a mistake, it should not have happened.
QUESTIONER: If the Har Homa decision was a mistake,
why did the United States refrain from condemning it?
AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON: Because in our view this
was an inflammatory resolution-if you read the language of
that resolution, it said Har Homa was illegal. Our position is this
is a dispute that the parties themselves need to resolve.
There is a political aspect, too. That is, if you look at the
Oslo Accords, the Camp David Accords, the negotiations call for
some very, very sensitive stages among the parties themselves.
When you go to the United Nations, there are an overwhelming
number of votes which are used to bash Israel-and I do not
mind saying this-in a fashion that does not build trust between
the parties. We should not be dealing with this at the United
Nations. There are some areas the United Nations should not
be dealing with- for example, NATO enlargement, and arms
control issues. These are bilateral issues among major powers
that are best dealt with through regional organizations, and
through other accords.
It does not mean the United Nations is the answer to every
issue, but it is important. We do think that the best thing for
these talks right now, which are at a very sensitive and difficult
stage, is not to inflame things. They are sensitive issues, I know
that, but we should get the parties themselves to resolve them.
QUESTION: U.N. activity is aided by cooperation with the
commercial sector. The United Nations has had a difficult his-
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tory dealing with multinational corporations and, on occasion,
the World Bank. What are your thoughts on improved interac-
tions with these institutions?
AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON: The United Nations can
run more businesslike. It can have more contact with corpora-
tions, the IMF, and World Bank. The Japanese Government has
a very good idea. In development issues, issues that deal and
relate to economic growth among countries-instead of having
a World Bank, an Inter-American Development Bank, Asian
Bank, bilateral aid programs, Export/Import Bank, and Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation-we should have an inter-
national integrated approach to development issues based on
private sector concepts. You know as well as I do that training
people and giving loans are going to do a lot more than direct
handouts.
QUESTION: Was there a defining moment when you real-
ized that you were good at negotiating?
AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON: You know, when it hap-
pened, I was in Baghdad, Iraq, and my hands were sweating be-
cause Saddam Hussein had walked in with about. fourteen of his
revolutionary guards with pistols. We sat down. I was trying to
get two U.S. pilots out. I had never been to Iraq. I had no cards
in my pocket. I was trying to persuade him to let these two indi-
viduals go that were wrongfully imprisoned. They had crossed
the border illegally, but they did not deserve seven year
sentences. I was trying to bring them back as a humanitarian
gesture.
I made a terrible mistake when I sat down to negotiate, to
try to persuade him. The very first thing I did was I crossed my
feet and showed him the balls of my sole. To an Arab that is the
ultimate insult. Saddam Hussein walked out of the meeting. I
had an interpreter with me, an Iraqi, and I said, "Am I toast? Is
this meeting over?" He said, "No, he'll be back, but you've in-
sulted him." I had to decide whether to apologize when he
comes back and start groveling or just continue the discussion
and move on. Even though I made that cultural mistake, I had
in my briefing book and in discussions with Arab scholars the
warning, "Saddam is going to try to intimidate you. You have to
be strong."
I gambled. When he returned, instead of groveling and say-
1520 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
ing, "Mr. President, I'm sorry, I shouldn't have crossed my legs,"
I went on. During the next twenty seconds, when I did not apol-
ogize, I could see his face turning from anger into a little bit of
respect.
At the end of the meeting what simply happened is two peo-
ple connected. I appealed on humanitarian grounds, we did not
reach an agreement on policy issues, and I got these two Ameri-
cans out. Then I knew that maybe, if you find a way to show
respect, connect with people, appreciate their culture, listen,
take abuse-as I did from Saddam for two hours on policy-that
somehow, maybe, this negotiating business was something that I
would like to do. That led to other missions.
But you ask what the defining moment was. I think that is:
when I made a mistake and reacted, I gambled, and the gamble
seems to have paid off.
